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Abstract: 
 
This article investigates whether long audit partner tenures impair auditor independence 
with a sample of Spanish companies for the period: 2002-2010. Independence is proxied by 
the opinion of the audit report. The motivation relies, on the one hand, on the current 
discussion about the necessity to reinforce the independence of auditors and, on the other 
hand, on the very limited available research at the partner level. The main result is the lack of 
significant effects of partner tenure on independence. This finding is robust to a series of 
checks. Unlike prior research, we also address the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure 
on independence. Results indicate that partner tenure does not compromise independence 
even under long or extremely long audit firm tenures. The Spanish audit market constitutes 
an ideal setting in which to address this issue, as it is characterized by unusually lengthy 
engagements with the audit firm. We report a negative effect of firm tenure on independence 
in the pre-crisis period, but not during the recent economic downturn or for the whole research 
period. This result suggests that auditors could be willing to impair independence in long 
tenures with the audit firm, except during economic downturns, when the risk of litigation 
increases.  
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1. Introduction 
Auditor independence is not a new issue in accounting research. In the late fifties McLaren 
(1958) pointed out that excessive familiarity could result in collusion between auditors and 
clients. Shortly afterwards, Mautz & Sharaf (1961) stated that extended auditor-client 
relationships could negatively affect independence because auditor's objectivity about a client 
would be reduced with the passage of time. Similarly, Hoyle (1978) argued that the audit 
program might become a routine as the auditor would anticipate the client’s systems and 
control procedures. These concerns were summarized by Shockley (1981, p. 789): 
“complacency, lack of innovation, less rigorous audit procedures and a developed confidence 
in the client may arise after a long association with the client”. However, more than two 
decades later, Myers et al. (2003) also argued that long relationships might cause auditor 
complacency about and possibly complicity in the decisions that management makes regarding 
the presentation of financial statements. As posed by Dopuch et al. (2003), this threat to 
independence does not limit to the time of the audit report, but it could also affect the 
judgments made by the auditor during the whole auditing process. Concerns about the 
negative effects of long tenures have also been expressed by the IFAC Code of Ethics: 
“familiarity threat occurs when, by virtue of a close relationship with an assurance client, its 
directors, officers or employees, a firm or a member of the assurance team becomes too 
sympathetic to the client’s interests” (IFAC Code of Ethics ED 2003, p. 18). 
However, potential loss of independence associated to long audit tenures needs to be 
balanced against other arguments suggesting that longer tenures could provide higher levels 
of audit quality. This was clearly posed by Myers et al. (2005) who argued that financial 
reporting problems are more likely to occur early in the auditor-client relationship, when the 
auditor is less familiar with the client’s business, processes and risks. The potential 
contradictory effects of tenure on audit quality are implicit in DeAngelo’s (1981) classical 
definition of audit quality as the joint probability an auditor will both detect and report material 
misstatements. Thus, audit quality would be a function of the ability to detect material 
misstatements (expertise) and the willingness to report detected misstatements 
(independence). The ability to detect misstatements should be higher when the auditor has 
deeper client knowledge, and this knowledge increases with tenure through a learning curve 
effect. However, the auditor’s willingness to report detected misstatements could be lower in 
lengthy engagements. To address these contradictory effects, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
required a study by the Comptroller General of the United States (GAO, 2003) about the 
potential effects of imposing the mandatory rotation of auditors. The results of the study did 
not show a negative effect of extended tenures on the quality of financial reports, and thus, it 
did not recommend rotation. However, the regulator finally established audit rotation at a 
partner level. Many countries worldwide have adopted similar rotation rules.  
This article investigates whether lengthy partner tenures impair auditor independence. 
Following previous research, the premise is that a less independent auditor will be less willing 
to issue a negative report so as not to lose clients (e.g., Chow & Rice, 1982; Craswell, 1988; 
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Krishnan, 1994). Our analysis is based on a sample of Spanish public companies for the nine-
year period 2002-2010.  
The motivation of this study relies on the lack of research on the relationship between 
tenure and auditor’s opinion at the partner level. This is mainly due to the fact that audit 
reports in many countries do not record the name of engagement partners. Thus, there are 
just a few articles addressing the effects of partner tenure on various proxies of audit quality, 
and only two of them (Carey & Simnett, 2006 (hereinafter, C&S) and Ye et al., 2011) have 
specifically examined the effects of tenure on the opinion of the audit report. The 2010 Green 
Paper on Audit Policy by the European Commission (hereinafter “the Green Paper”) explicitly 
acknowledged the necessity of further research on the tenure-audit quality relationship within 
the EU. Four years after the release of the Green Paper, the Directive 2014/56/EU amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts and 
the Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on specific 
requirements regarding statutory audit of public-interest entities (hereinafter “the 2014 EU 
Regulation”) clearly indicate that the independence of auditors constitutes a major issue for 
European regulators and also for scholars (e.g., Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2013; Cameran et al., 
2014 and 2015).  
We aim to contribute to the literature by extending prior research in various ways. Firstly, 
for the first time, the effects of partner tenure on the opinion of the audit report are studied in 
a low litigation risk country. Since litigation risk constitutes a major motivation in the auditor 
reporting decision, auditors’ incentives to maintain independence should be stronger in high 
litigation risk countries than in low litigation ones. Thus, evidence reported in high litigation 
countries cannot be directly extrapolated to low litigation countries. We aim to fulfil this gap 
in the literature. Moreover, in the current discussion on auditor independence within the EU, 
the evidence we report might be useful for other low litigation risk European countries. 
Secondly, while the scarce available evidence about the effects of partner tenure on audit 
qualifications has been obtained under voluntary partner rotation, we provide evidence 
obtained under mandatory partner rotation. Since partner rotation is currently mandatory in 
many countries, it is necessary to update the available evidence on the partner tenure-
independence relationship to this regulatory framework. Thirdly, unlike prior research, we 
include audit firm tenure into the analysis of the effects of partner tenure. This point enhances 
the contribution of our paper in two ways. On the one hand, because as firm and partner 
tenures would show some positive correlation, the omission of audit firm tenure in the analysis 
could cause misleading results, as partner tenure will also account for the effects of the omitted 
variable firm tenure. On the other hand, because the inclusion of firm tenure allows to examine 
the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure. Hence, we can address, for example, whether 
the effects of partner tenure on independence are more server under longer tenures with the 
audit firm. 
Anticipating our main result, partner tenure does not seem to have significant effects on 
the likelihood of audit qualifications. This result is robust to a series of checks. Moreover, we 
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do not find different implications of partner tenure on auditor independence depending on the 
tenure with the audit firm.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines a review of the literature on the 
tenure-independence relationship. Section three summarizes recent policy developments 
regarding audit partner rotation in major jurisdictions around the world and, afterwards, 
focusses on the Spanish audit market. In section four we articulate the research question and 
present the design of the research. The discussion of the results and sensitivity analyses are 
addressed in section five. Finally, the conclusions and implications of our findings are drawn in 
section six. 
 
 
2. Review of the literature 
There is some contradiction between the causes of deterioration of independence in long 
audit tenures suggested in the literature (e.g., Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; Shockley, 1981; Dopuch 
et al., 2003) and the methodology used to assess the significance of such causes. Thus, the 
negative implications of long tenures for independence would usually derive from personal 
relationships between the company’s management team and the incumbent auditor. Since 
personal relationships cannot be achieved between firms, the main threat to independence 
should not be long audit firm tenures but long partner tenures. Nevertheless, empirical 
research has addressed the relationship between tenure and independence almost exclusively 
at the firm level. Such a situation is mostly explained by the fact that in many countries audit 
reports do not record the name of the engagement partner. Nevertheless, even in those 
countries in which audit reports record the name of the audit partner like Spain, some studies 
have investigated the implications of long audit firm tenures (e.g., Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004; 
and 2006) but none has addressed the effects of long partner tenures. 
While a number of articles have studied the effects of audit firm tenure on the opinion of 
the audit report (e.g., Louwers, 1998; Carcello & Neal, 2000; Gul et al., 2011), only C&S and 
more recently Ye et al. (2011) have examined the issue at partner level. Since the probability 
of switching the audit firm increases after a qualified opinion, the issuance of qualified reports 
can be viewed as an exercise of independence. C&S found that the auditor’s propensity to 
issue going-concern modified opinions (GCMOs) diminishes over the audit partner’s tenure, 
after controlling for other factors which influenced this propensity. The authors, therefore, 
concluded that long tenures are negatively associated to independence. They acknowledged, 
however, that the deterioration of independence was confined to non-Big 4 audit firms. 
Consistent with C&S findings, Ye et al. (2011) found that longer engagement partner tenure 
is associated with a reduction in the propensity to issue GCMOs. As both papers investigated 
the same audit market, the reporting of similar results was to be expected. Beyond the tenure-
audit qualifications relationships, scholars have also investigated the effects of partner tenure 
on other proxies of audit quality, such as the quality of earnings. With a private sample of US 
companies, Manry et al. (2008) concluded that audit quality increases with tenure, as 
discretionary accruals were significantly and negatively associated to the lead audit partner’s 
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tenure. However, this significant effect was observed only for relatively small clients having 
fairly lengthy partner tenures. In the same line, evidence available for Taiwan (Chi & Huang, 
2005; Chen et al., 2008; Chi et al., 2011) and China (Gul et al., 2013) supports a positive 
effect of partner tenure on earnings quality. Conversely, C&S1 and Fargher et al. (2008) found 
lower manager’s accounting discretion in the initial years of tenure of a new audit partner, 
thus suggesting a negative effect of partner tenure on audit quality in Australian. A final set of 
papers has not directly examined the implications of partner tenure on audit quality but the 
related issue of the implications of the auditor rotation regime. Hence, Chi et al. (2009) 
concluded that mandatory partner rotation does not enhance audit quality in Taiwan. It should 
be noted, however, that they examined the quality of earnings only during the first year of the 
engagement with the new partner. More recently, Firth et al. (2012) found that firms under 
mandatory partner rotation show significantly higher likelihood of modified opinions than no-
rotation firms, in China. Therefore, contrary to Chi et al. (2009), they concluded that 
mandatory partner rotation does enhance audit quality. 
Although, as posed by Bamber & Bamber (2009), the effects of audit firm rotation cannot 
be extrapolated to partner rotation,2 evidence reported at the audit firm level might provide 
some insights into the effects of partner tenure on independence. Thus, next we summarize 
available evidence at the audit firm level. Empirical research has, for the most part, rejected 
that long firm tenures threaten independence. With samples of US financially distressed firms, 
Louwers (1998) and Carcello & Neal (2000) do not support a significant effect of tenure on the 
auditors' reporting decision. A similar conclusion was reached by Vanstraelen (2002) and 
Knechel & Vanstraelen (2007) for the Belgian market. The former included both financially 
distressed and non-distressed companies, while the latter was limited to companies entering 
bankruptcy. Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2004) and (2006) investigated the issuance of GCMOs to 
financially distressed companies in Spain. The authors did not report loss of independence with 
tenure. However, more recent research has provided some contradictory results. Hence, Lim 
& Tan (2010) reported a positive effect of tenure on the propensity to issue GCMOs to 
financially distressed firms. Conversely, Gul et al. (2011) concluded that auditors were willing 
to forgo their independence by issuing fewer GCMOs when auditor tenure was long. All the 
aforementioned studies share the focus on GCMOs. The studies by Vanstraelen (2000) for the 
Belgian market, and Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2005) for Spain represent exceptions to the 
mainstream approach, as they include all types of modified opinions into the analysis and do 
not limit the sample to financially distressed firms. Hence, Vanstraelen (2000) concluded that 
long-term auditor-client relationships significantly increase (decrease) the likelihood of 
unqualified reports (auditor’s independence) in the Belgian market. Conversely, Ruiz-
                                                          
1 Although they did not find a significant effect of tenure on either working capital accruals or abnormal 
working capital accruals, they reported that a lower proportion of clients misses breakeven for long partner 
tenure observations, suggesting a greater ability to manage earnings.  
2 According to the authors, when the audit firm rotates, the new firm brings a new team, applies its own 
methodology and new client procedures, while in partner rotation, in most cases, all that changes is one 
audit partner. 
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Barbadillo et al. (2005) did not observe loss of independence with tenure, as the likelihood of 
modified opinions was in fact higher in longer tenures.  
Summarizing previous research, empirical evidence generally supports the view that long 
audit firm tenures would not impair independence. The limited available evidence at the 
partner level shows a negative effect of tenure on audit qualification, while results regarding 
the effects of tenure on earnings quality are mixed. Therefore, empirical evidence would 
support mandatory rotation rules currently established in many countries imposing rotation 
only at the partner level. However, evidence at the partner level should be carefully 
approached, as it is scarce and limited to just a few countries. 
 
3. The regulation of auditor tenure in major jurisdictions 
Audit tenure can be measured at firm and partner levels. While many countries have 
established the mandatory rotation of engagement partners, the rotation of the audit firm is 
generally voluntary. Thus, regulators seem to assume that whereas long partner tenures would 
constitute a serious threat to independence, long audit firm tenures would not. However, this 
view might be changing according with the concerns expressed in the Green Paper (EC, 2010, 
p. 11) which states: ‘even when "key audit partners" are regularly rotated as currently 
mandated by the Directive, the threat of familiarity persists’. These concerns led to the 2014 
EU Regulation, which establishes the mandatory rotation of the audit firm after a maximum of 
ten years within the EU.  
Even though the results of the study required by the SOX did not recommend mandatory 
rotation in the US, regulators finally established that lead audit partners and concurring 
partners could not perform audit services for the same client for more than five consecutive 
fiscal years. Many countries worldwide have adopted similar audit rotation rules. For example, 
by the year 2008, the State members of the EU were required to adapt national law systems 
to the revised 8th Company Law Directive. A main feature of the Directive was to enforce audit 
rotation at the partner level, although each State could voluntarily establish the maximum 
length of the auditor-client relationship. Nevertheless, even before the Directive was issued, 
some countries had already implemented auditor partner rotation rules as a direct response 
to the SOX. For example, maximum partner tenure of seven years was established in Spain 
after the Financial Law was passed in 2002 and in Germany after the reform of its Commercial 
Code in 2004. At present, several maximum periods coexist within the EU, for example, five 
years in the United Kingdom, six years in France or seven years in Germany and Spain. In 
Japan, the mandatory rotation of the engagement partner after seven years was established 
in 2003. A similar legislation was introduced in Australia in 2004, requiring that the audit 
partner of listed companies to be rotated after no more than five years. These legislative 
changes have followed the recommendations of the IFAC Code of Ethics, which explicitly 
recognized that prolonged use of the same lead engagement partner might create a ‘familiarity 
threat’. Accordingly, the Code proposed the mandatory rotation of the lead engagement 
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partner after seven years and a two-year period before the rotating partner could resume the 
lead engagement partner role. 
Although most countries only require the rotation of the lead audit partner, a few ones 
have enforced a mandatory rotation rule for the audit firm. Hence, periodical rotation of 
external auditor of public companies was established in Italy in 1974, which cannot be audited 
by the same firm for more than nine consecutive years. In addition, a minimum of three years 
was required before an auditor could be reappointed. Similarly, Brazil (five years), Singapore 
(five years) and South Korea (six years) have also established the rotation of the audit firm 
(Cameran et al., 2005). 
Regarding the regulation of audit tenure in Spain, the 1988 Spanish Audit Law imposed 
the mandatory rotation of the audit firm after nine years. Nevertheless, as a result of a 
subsequent legal reform in 1995, the mandatory rotation was abolished. Thus, the mandatory 
rotation of the audit firm was, in fact, never applied in Spain. After the reform, auditors could 
be engaged for an initial period between three and nine years, but after the expiration of the 
initial engagement the company could renew the contract with the same auditor on a yearly 
basis. Researchers have widely agreed that Spanish legislation has not been particularly strict 
regarding safeguards to strength auditor independence (e.g., Gonzalo Angulo, 1995; Paz-Ares, 
1996; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004). With the same aim as the SOX in the U.S., the Spanish 
Financial Law was passed in 2002. An amendment was included during the Law’s approval 
process including the mandatory rotation of the audit firm after twelve years. According to this 
amendment, the change of the audit firm would be mandatory after the expiration of this term, 
and a minimum three-year period was required to re-hire the audit firm. Similarly to the 1988 
firm rotation rule, this amendment led to strong criticism from the auditing profession (Ruiz-
Barbadillo et al., 2006), causing its final withdrawal. Mandatory rotation after seven years was 
finally imposed, but limited to the audit team not to the audit firm. In addition, a minimum 
two years period was required before the partner could be reappointed. The maximum partner 
tenure of seven years has also been maintained by the 2010 reform of the Spanish Audit Law, 
however, without imposing the rotation of the rest of the audit team. Finally, a new Audit Law 
to adapt the Spanish regulation to the 2014 EU Regulation is currently in the process of 
approval by the Spanish Parliament.   
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Research design and hypothesis development 
 This paper addresses the effects of partner tenure on auditor independence, measuring 
independence through the ability of the auditor to issue a qualified report. As prior research, 
we assume that a more independent auditor will be more willing to issue a qualified report to 
a client. Yet, it should be noted that most prior research measuring independence by the 
opinion of the audit report has been conducted in high litigation risk countries (e.g., DeFond 
et al., 2002; C&S; Ye et al., 2011). In these countries, potential litigation costs should provide 
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strong incentives to auditors to preserve independence. Hence, we could wonder whether this 
framework is still valid in a low litigation risk country such as Spain. We consider that even in 
low litigation risk countries, and more specifically in Spain, there are incentives for auditors to 
maintain independence. This view is supported by prior research conducted in low litigation 
risk countries measuring audit quality by the opinion of the audit report (e.g., Laitinen and 
Laitinen, 1998 for Finland; Vanstraelen, 2000 and 2002 and Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007 for 
Belgium; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2004 and 2006 for Spain; Lam & Mensah, 2006 for Hong Kong; 
Chi & Chin et al., 2011 for Taiwan; Firth et al., 2012 for China). As clearly put by Lam & Mensah 
(2006), the maintenance of a high litigation risk environment does not appear to be a 
necessary pre-requisite for high quality audits. Moreover, in the specific case of the Spanish 
audit market it should be noted that, on the one hand, the supervisory agency ICAC (Institute 
of Accounting and Auditing) has imposed some penalties to audit firms for low quality audits 
(for example, Deloitte received a 12 million € fine after the Bankia scandal) and, on the other 
hand, the market shows an extreme concentration by Big 4 firms (firms with strong incentives 
to maintain reputation, and therefore independence). Hence, we conclude that, although 
incentives to maintain independence are expected to be stronger in high litigation counties, in 
low litigation countries and, particularly in Spain, auditors still face incentives to maintain 
independence and, consequently, to provide high quality audits. 
 While most studies on auditor independence have restricted the analysis to financially 
distressed companies and have examined only GCMOs (e.g., C&S and Ye et al., 2011), some 
papers have followed a more comprehensive approach and have included all types of firms and 
audit qualifications into the analysis (e.g., Laitinen & Laitinen, 1998; Vanstraelen, 2000; Ruiz-
Barbadillo et al., 2005; Chi & Chin, 2011; Firth et al., 2012). Such a view would be supported 
by empirical evidence reporting negative effects of a qualified report for the auditor client (e.g., 
Ball et al., 1979; Chow & Rice, 1982; Levinthal & Fichman, 1988; Choi & Jeter, 1992) and 
therefore a higher probability of losing the client after a qualified report (e.g., Chow & Rice, 
1982b; Craswell, 1988; Krishnan, 1994). Accordingly, the issuance of qualified opinions (not 
only GCMOs) by the auditor represents an exercise of independence. Besides, this approach 
presents some advantages in terms of generalization of the reported results and also allows 
to address the classical role of the auditor which is not bankruptcy prediction. Therefore, 
similarly to Laitinen & Laitinen (1998), Vanstraelen (2000), Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2005), Chi 
& Chin (2011) and Firth et al. (2012), we consider audit reports with either qualified, 
unfavorable, disclaimer of opinion, or with explanatory paragraphs expressing doubts about 
the future of the company, collectively as qualified reports. 
Consequently, our research question states: 
Does auditor independence, measured through the opinion of the audit report, 
decrease with auditor tenure? 
 Following DeAngelo’s (1981) classical definition of audit quality, long-tenured partners 
would be expected to be better able to detect misstatements but could also be less willing to 
report the detected misstatements. As discussed in the introductory section, long tenures 
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might weaken auditor’s objectivity (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961), strengthen confidence in the client 
(Shockley, 1981), and, as a result, make qualified reports less likely. In this line, evidence 
reported by C&S and Ye et al. (2011) has shown lower likelihood of audit qualifications in 
longer partner tenures in Australia. Thus, even in countries characterized by high litigation 
risk, independence seems to be impaired in long engagements with the audit partner. Since 
auditor’s litigation risk is lower in Spain than it is in Australia, auditors’ incentives to maintain 
independence in longer tenures would also be expected to be lower. Accordingly, we predict a 
weakening of independence in lengthy engagements with the audit partner, and thus the first 
hypothesis states: 
Hypothesis #1 (H1): The likelihood of a qualified report will decrease with audit 
partner tenure. 
 
 Although the main interest in this research is on the impact of partner tenure, the effects 
of audit firm tenure are also examined. The above discussion on H1 can be used to develop 
the hypothesis on the effects of audit firm tenure. As posed by Bamber & Bamber (2009), 
when the audit partner is changed by another partner of the same audit firm, the rest of the 
audit team remains with the client. Thus, the same factors which could explain a negative 
impact of lengthy engagements with the audit partner on independence would also explain the 
effects of lengthy engagements with the audit team. In this line, the Green Paper warns that, 
even when lead partners are regularly rotated, the threat of familiarity persists. While prior 
evidence for the Spanish audit market has provided mixed results, we predict a negative effect 
of audit firm tenure on the likelihood of a qualified report. This expectation relies on two main 
points. On the one hand, on the concerns expressed by the Green Paper and the 2014 EU 
regulation regarding the negative effects of long audit firm tenures on audit quality within the 
EU. If European regulators consider that long audit firm tenures impair independence at the 
EU level, this problem should be more serious in low litigation countries such as Spain. On the 
other hand, on the relatively long audit firm tenures in Spain by international standards. Longer 
tenures provide more room for a bonding effect in the auditor-client relationship. Thus, our 
second hypothesis states: 
 Hypothesis #2 (H2): The likelihood of a qualified report will decrease with audit 
firm tenure. 
 
 Unlike prior research, this paper also addresses the interaction effects of firm and partner 
tenures on auditor independence. We wonder whether, let’s say, five years of partner tenure 
involve the same potential implications for auditor independence, under five or 20 years of 
tenure with the audit firm. As discussed above, when the audit partner is changed but not the 
audit firm, the rest of the audit team remains with the client, and neither the audit 
methodology nor the client’s procedures tend to change (Bamber & Bamber, 2009). Thus, the 
potentially negative implications of partner tenure on independence could also depend on the 
tenure with the audit firm, as the marginal effect of one more year of partner tenure on the 
partner’s involvement with the client might be stronger under long tenures with the audit firm. 
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In long audit firm tenures, long-time standing audit teams would be expected to facilitate the 
bonds between a new lead audit partner and the client’s management team. Hence, the 
“familiarity threat” (IFAC, 2003) of long tenures with the audit partner would be expected to 
be more severe under long audit firm tenures. Accordingly, the third hypothesis states: 
 
Hypothesis #3 (H3): The negative effects of partner tenure on the likelihood 
of a qualified report will be stronger under long audit firm tenures. 
  
 To test H1 and H2 we will estimate the model given by (1).  
 OPINION = β0 + β1*PBANK + β2*SIZE + β3*AGE + β4*LEV + β5*CLEV  
 + β6*LLOSS + β7*INVEST + β8*AUDFIRM + β9*FIRMTEN 
 + β10*PARTEN + Σ(δ*YEAR) + Σ(Φ*INDUSTRY) + ε   (1) 
 
where: 
Dependent Variable: 
OPINION: 1 if company receives a modified audit opinion in the audit report and 0 otherwise. 
 
Experimental Variables: 
FIRMTEN: the number of consecutive years audited by the same audit firm. 
PARTEN: the number of consecutive years the same partner has been signing the audit report 
of the company. 
 
Control Variables: 
PBANK: probability of bankruptcy as measured by adjusted Zmijewski score, with the weights 
proposed by Carcello et al. (1995); 
SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company at financial year-end; 
AGE: natural logarithm of the number of years since listing on the supervisor of the Spanish 
stock market; 
LEV: total liabilities divided by total equity; 
CLEV: change in LEV during the year; 
LLOSS: 1 if client reported negative net income for the previous year and 0 otherwise; 
INVEST: current assets less debtors and inventories divided by current liabilities; 
AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise; 
 
Year controls: 
Eight year dummies indicating years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
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Industry controls: 
We follow the sector classification provided by the Madrid Stock Exchange which includes six 
main industries. Thus, five dummies variables indicating the firm’s industry are included in (1).  
 According to H1 (H2) we expect a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
associated to PARTEN (FIRMTEN). To test H3 we will estimate the model given by (2). To define 
long audit firm tenures (LONGFT: 1 if tenure is ten years or more and 0 otherwise) we use the 
median value of FIRTEN as the cutoff point. This model includes the same variables as model 
(1) but also the interaction variable PARTEN*LONGFT. According to H3 we expect a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient associated to this variable. 
OPINION = α0 + α1*PBANK + α2*SIZE + α3*AGE + α4*LEV + α5*CLEV  
+ α6*LLOSS + α7*INVEST + α8*AUDFIRM + α9*FIRMTEN  
+ α10*PARTEN + α11* PARTEN*LONGFT + Σ(ζ*YEAR)  
+ Σ(ξ*INDUSTRY) + µ       (2) 
 
 Control variables in (1) and (2) are similar as those in C&S, Laitinen & Laitinen (1998) or 
Chi & Chin (2011) to estimate the auditor’s probability of issuing a qualified report, consisting 
basically in financial ratios. Although C&S limit the analysis to GCMOs and financially distressed 
firms, similarly to Laitinen & Laitinen (1998) and Chi and Chin (2011), we do not restrict the 
analysis to financial distressed firms and consider audit reports with either qualified, 
unfavorable, disclaimer of opinion, or explanatory paragraphs, collectively as qualified reports. 
PBANK measures the probability of bankruptcy based on Zmijewski (1984), where higher 
values indicate a higher probability of bankruptcy. Thus we predict a positive effect on PBANK 
on the likelihood of audit qualifications. SIZE is included to control for the impact it can have 
on the propensity of the auditor to be independent. Hence, small clients would face higher risk 
of bankruptcy and this should increase the likelihood of qualified reports (Francis & Krishnan, 
1999; Reynolds & Francis, 2001). Besides, small clients have lower negotiating power with the 
auditor to avoid audit qualifications. However, on the other hand, since large clients involve 
potentially higher litigation costs, auditors might be more willing to issue qualified reports to 
these clients (Craswell et al. 2002). Consequently, the sign on the coefficient for SIZE could 
be either positive or negative. AGE accounts for a higher risk of financial distress for younger 
companies (Dopuch et al., 1987). Accordingly, we predict a negative effect of AGE on the 
likelihood of a qualified report. LEV measures the risk associated to higher levels of debt, while 
CLEV captures changes in leverage that may make companies to unsustainable levels of debt. 
Hence, financial leverage will raise litigation risk as it makes bankruptcy more likely. In 
addition, highly levered firms tend to present lower accounting quality (Aharony et al., 1993). 
Thus, we predict a positive effect of both LEV and CLEV on the likelihood of a qualified report. 
LLOSS and INVEST are included because companies with losses and low levels of liquidity are 
more likely to enter bankruptcy (Reynolds & Francis, 2001) and also, similarly to what occurs 
with leverage, to manipulate earnings. Hence, we expect positive (negative) effects of LLOSS 
(INVEST) on the likelihood of audit qualifications. Finally, AUDFIRM accounts for a potential 
higher propensity to issue qualified reports by big 4 auditors.  
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4.2. Sample and dataset 
 We perform the empirical analysis on the basis of non-financial companies quoted in the 
Spanish Stock Exchange (Sistema de Interconexión Bursátil Español) during the research 
period 2002-2010. In addition, to be able to compute the length of audit partner tenure, for 
the companies in the sample, information about the auditor opinion and the name of the 
engagement partner should be available for the period 1995-2010. Information regarding audit 
reports is obtained from the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), while data 
about independent variables in the models is provided by Thomson Reuters Knowledge. Our 
dataset is formed by 83 firms and, given the nine-year research period, by 747 firm-year 
observations. However, in 12 cases, information about at least one variable in the models was 
not available. Therefore, the sample is finally formed by 735 observations. We examine 735 
audit reports, 600 of them unqualified and 135 have a qualified opinion. GCMOs have been 
relatively scarce in our research period, as only 13 out of the 135 qualified reports have 
GCMOs. Besides, none of the audit reports has an adverse opinion or a disclaimer of opinion. 
 In the Report on the Review of the Annual Financial Reports filled with the CNMV (CNMV, 
2009), the regulator of the Spanish stock market classifies audit qualifications into two major 
groups: Quantified and unquantified. In addition, quantified qualifications are also classified 
into two subgroups depending on whether they affect profit and losses or equity. Similarly, 
unquantified qualifications are also classified into ‘Uncertainty and others’ and ‘Limitations’. 
Among qualifications due to uncertainties, the most serious ones are those concerning the 
continuation of business, in which the auditor expresses its doubts about the future of the 
company. However, uncertainties can also have less dramatic effects; for example, they can 
be associated to the firm’s ability to recover some tax credits. On the other hand, qualifications 
for limitations on scope show that the auditor has not had enough information to apply the 
procedures required by the technical auditing standards. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics about the variables used in the models. Qualified 
audit reports represent 15 percent of the total sample. Average partner tenure is three years, 
rather below the maximum tenure established by Spanish legislation. It should be noted that 
the maximum tenure in our sample is nine years, two years over the maximum of seven years 
established by the Spanish law. Regarding the tenure with the audit firm, the average of ten 
years with a maximum of 24 years would show the relatively long audit firm tenures in Spain 
by international standards.3 On average, companies in the sample have been reporting to 
CNMV for 16 years. Regarding the type of audit firm, companies audited by Big 4 auditors 
represent 92 percent of the sample, thus showing an extreme concentration of the Spanish 
audit market by Big 4 auditors by international standards.4 
                                                          
3 For example, the average audit firm tenure is 5.7 years in Chi & Huang (2005); 3.6 years in Knechel & 
Vanstraelen (2007); 8.6 years in Gul et al. (2007); 6.9 years in Chen et al. (2008); and 6.9 years in Lim 
& Tan (2010). 
4 For example, 64% reported by C&S for Australia or 80% reported by Chi & Huang (2005) for Taiwan. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
Table 2 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients, with significance levels, between pairs of 
variables. In general, correlation levels are rather low, with a maximum value of 0.56 between 
LEV and CLEV. The correlation pattern of OPINION with the independent variables strongly 
supports the discussion carried out at the end of the previous section. Hence, qualified opinions 
would be negatively associated to the firm’s financial health (LEV, CLEV, LLOSS and INVEST) 
and to SIZE, while no significant relationship is observed with PBANK, AGE or AUDFIRM. 
Moreover, although no significant association between OPINION and PARTEN is reported, 
OPINION would be negatively related to FIRMTEN. This would suggest loss of independence in 
longer tenures with the audit firm though not in longer tenures with the audit partner. Focusing 
on independent variables, correlation matrix shows some rather obvious results, as the 
correlation pattern of PBANK with LEV, CLEV, LLOSS and INVEST. However, some other results 
are more interesting. For example, companies audited by Big 4 firms tend to be relatively 
larger and more profitable. These companies also show longer firm tenures but shorter partner 
tenures, the later indicating that partner rotation is higher among clients of Big 4 firms. This 
probably reflects both, a greater willingness of Big 4 firms to rotate partners, as well as a 
better chance of doing so compared to non-Big 4 firms. Finally, results for variables measuring 
tenure would show the expected positive correlation between PARTEN and FIRMTEN.  
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
5. Results 
Firstly, we present and discuss the results of a preliminary univariate analysis and 
afterwards address the multivariate logistic analysis. Finally, in the last subsection, we examine 
the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure on auditor independence.  
 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of the univariate analysis. As the Shapiro-Wilk test strongly 
rejects the hypothesis of normality for each independent variable, the Mann-Whitney test of 
differences of medians is performed in order to assess the statistical significance of these 
differences. Median values of independent variables across subsamples of firms, according to 
the opinion of the audit report, and significance levels (from the Mann-Whitney test for 
continuous variables and the chi-square test for dichotomous variables) are provided. As 
shown by the table, PARTEN is not significantly associated to the opinion of the audit report. 
Conversely, firms with unqualified reports tend to show significantly longer engagements with 
the audit firm. In both cases, these results would support the correlation pattern shown by 
table 2. Results regarding control variables are, in general, far from surprising. Hence, firms 
with qualified reports show relatively lower levels of solvency (PBANK, LLOSS and INVEST) 
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and tend to be smaller than firms with unqualified reports. However, we do not find significant 
results for, AGE, LEV, CLEV or AUDFIRM.  
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis 
In this subsection we address the joint effect of partner tenure and the proposed control 
variables on the likelihood of audit qualifications through logistic regression models. Results of 
the estimation of (1) are shown in table 4 (column A). 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
Unlike C&S and Ye et al. (2011) who used cross-sectional datasets, we follow a panel data 
approach. Datasets with panel structure allow to control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity better, and therefore to reduce the likelihood of reporting purely spurious effects 
due to an omitted variable bias. In the particular case of audit qualifications, given the 
relatively low explanatory power of the models proposed, the omitted variable bias could be 
serious. In keeping with the panel structure of the dataset we perform panel data logistic 
regressions. As expected, the likelihood ratio test supports the use of a panel data approach 
to estimate the model (P-value < 0.000) over a classical pooled regression. Besides, the model 
is statistically significant (P-value < 0.000), indicating that observations are well fitted by the 
model. Other indicators of the model’s goodness of fit are the pseudo R2 and the percentage 
of cases correctly predicted. Hence, the model explains 28 percent of the total variance and 
correctly classifies 90 percent of cases. Although correlation coefficients between pairs of 
independent variables shown in table 2 did not suggest serious multicollinearity, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) are calculated after the estimation to rule out the negative potential 
effects of multicollinearity. As expected, VIF (not reported) are rather low, with a maximum 
value of 1.68 for variable LEV, thus supporting the initial view that multicollinearity would not 
affect our results.  
The main result in table 4 (column A) is that partner tenure does not significantly affect 
the issuance of audit qualifications. This finding had been anticipated by the correlation pattern 
in table 2 and later by the univariate analysis in table 3. Accordingly, H1, stating that the 
likelihood of a qualified report will decrease with audit partner tenure, would be rejected. Since 
we do not limited to GCMOs or to financially distressed firms, this result is not fully comparable 
to those provided by either C&S or Ye et al. (2011), both papers reporting a negative effect of 
partner tenure on the likelihood of GCMOs in the Australian market. Besides, it should be noted 
that while C&S and Ye et al. (2011) investigated partner tenure under voluntary partner 
rotation, our research is carried out under a mandatory partner rotation rule. However, despite 
the limited comparability between our results with both C&S and Ye et al. (2011), it is somehow 
surprising that long partner tenures seem to involve negative effects on independence in the 
high litigation risk Australian audit market but not Spain. Similarly to partner tenure, the 
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effects of audit firm tenure on the likelihood audit qualifications are also non-significant, and 
thus H2 is also rejected.  
Results regarding control variables strongly meet our expectations after the review of prior 
research and the univariate analysis. Hence, audit qualifications would be more likely for 
companies with lower solvency (PBANK, LLOSS and INVEST). In section 4 we had not predicted 
the sign of the effect for SIZE as, on the one hand, large companies tend to exhibit higher 
audit quality and negotiating power with the audit firm, but, on the other hand, these 
companies also involve higher levels of litigation risk for the audit firm. Results would indicate 
that audit qualifications are more likely for small than for large firms. As predicted, clients of 
Big 4 audit firms show higher probability of receiving a qualified report. However, we do not 
report significant results for AGE, LEV or CLEV. In all three cases the lack of significance had 
been anticipated by the univariate analysis in table 3.  
 As usual in the literature, we perform a series of checks to assess the robustness of results. 
Firstly, we address the potential effects of influential observations. Hence, after the estimation 
of (1) we detected 13 influential observations (with Pregibon dbeta higher than 0.2). Results 
of the reestimation of (1) without these observations (not reported) are qualitatively the same 
as those in column A, and therefore we conclude that our results are not affected by influential 
observations. The second analysis aims to assess potential endogeneity problems associated 
to those companies changing the audit firm (and thus also the audit partner) as a result of a 
qualified opinion. Thus, we reestimate (1) after removing from the sample 91 observations 
with one or two years of audit firm tenure. Results of the new estimation (not reported) are 
qualitatively the same as those in in column A. Thirdly, we check the robustness of results to 
an alternative measure of partner tenure. Hence, we substitute the single linear variable 
PARTEN for the two dichotomous variables SHORTPARTEN (1 if partner tenure is three years 
or less and 0 otherwise) and LONGPARTEN (1 if partner tenure is more than four years and 0 
otherwise). We chose the median value of PARTEN to delimitate short partner tenures. Results 
of the new estimation in table 4 (column B) do not show any significant effects for either 
SHORTPARTEN or LONGPARTEN. Thus, the non-significant effect of partner tenure on audit 
qualification does not depend on how partner tenure is measured. In the same line, Davis et 
al. (2009) posed that audit quality could increase in early years through a learning effect, but 
it would decrease in later years due to a bonding effect. Although the authors studied the 
effects of audit firm tenure, the explanation could be easily extended to partner tenure. Hence, 
we estimate a quadratic model with PARTEN and the new variable PARTEN2, defined as the 
square of PARTEN. Under the non-monotonic effect of tenure, the coefficient of PARTEN should 
be positive and significant while the coefficient of PARTEN2 should be negative and significant. 
Results in table 4 (column C) do not support a non-monotonic effect of partner tenure on audit 
qualifications, as neither PARTEN nor PARTEN2 show any significant effects. The following 
analysis addresses a potential flaw in our model due to the inclusion of GCMOs and NGCMOs 
as a single category of the dependent variable OPINION. It could be argued that, as both types 
of audit qualifications refer to different dimensions of the audit activity and could also involve 
different levels of litigation risk, the inclusion of GCMOs and NGCMOs as a single category of 
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the dependent variable might cause misleading results. Hence, similarly to Chi & Chin (2011) 
we reestimate (1) after the removal from the sample of those observations with GCMOs. As 
expected, given the low incidence of GCMOs in our data, results reported in column D are very 
similar to those in column A, in particular regarding FIRMTEN and PARTEN.  
We also address the robustness of our results to situations of superficial partner rotation. 
Whenever a mandatory partner rotation rule has been implemented, a so-called ‘period of 
grace’ has also been established. As an example, the SOX required a five-year time-out period 
before a partner could re-audit a client. In Spain this period is limited to only two years. Chen 
et al. (2008) and Bamber & Bamber (2009) posed the importance of differentiating between 
situations of rotation and those that could be considered as superficial rotation, in which the 
partner re-audit the same firm again after a short period out the firm. This issue might affect 
results, since in these situations the measure of tenure as the number of consecutive years 
auditing the same company will not adequately account for the nature of the relationship 
between the partner and the client.5 Therefore, partner tenure measures generally used in the 
literature, which do not control for superficial rotation, could provide misleading results. 
Obviously, the potential implications of ignoring situations of superficial rotation will depend 
on its frequency in the sample. Our dataset comprises 192 partner changes, including eight 
cases in which the new partner had audited the company before. The eight cases represent 23 
observations. While in half of them the partner remained rotated off for three years or less, in 
the remaining four cases it was out of the firm at least six years. Given the low incidence of 
superficial rotation in our sample, we do not expect it can seriously affect reported results. 
Nevertheless, we re-estimate (1), initially without the 23 observations potentially affected by 
superficial rotation and then reducing the sample only by the four cases (10 observations) in 
which the partner remained rotated off for three years or less. As expected, results (not 
reported) do not show any significant differences compared to those reported in column A for 
the whole sample. 
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
The final analysis performed accounts for the potential effects of economic downturns on 
the tenure-independence relationship. Periods of economic downturns involve higher litigation 
risk for the audit firm as the risk of bankruptcy increases. Therefore, we might expect auditors 
being less willing to impair independence in long-term engagements with either the partner or 
the audit firm during these periods. To address this issue we split our sample into two 
subsamples (pre-crisis and crisis) and afterwards perform sequential estimations of (1) for 
each subsample. Results of the new estimations are shown in table 5. The most interesting 
finding would be that while PARTEN remains non-significant in both estimations, this is not the 
case with FIRMTEN, which shows significant results in the estimation conducted with the pre-
                                                          
5 To clarify this issue, we can imagine two partners auditing two different companies for the two-year 
period 2008-2009. However, while the first auditor had already audited the company during the whole 
period 2000-2005, the second auditor had not previously audited the company. Although familiarity 
threats associated to tenure would be expected to be rather different in both situations, the value of the 
variable partner tenure will be two years in both cases. 
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crisis subsample. The negative sign of the coefficient would indicate loss of independence in 
longer tenures with the audit firm in the pre-crisis period. The lack of significance of FIRMEN 
in the estimation with the crisis subsample and the significance effect with negative sign in the 
estimation with the pre-crisis subsample would be in line with our expectations discussed 
above that auditors would be less willing to impair independence during periods of economic 
downturns.  
 
5.3. The interaction of firm and partner tenure  
Could the potential loss of independence in longer partner tenures depend on the tenure 
with the audit firm? In our view, it cannot be assumed, on an a priori basis, that, for example, 
four years of partner tenure should involve the same effects on independence under four or 
20 years of audit firm tenure. As posed by Bamber & Bamber (2009), in audit partner rotation, 
in most cases, all that changes is one audit partner, while remaining most of the audit team 
and the audit firm's methodology and procedures. While studies on the effects of partner 
tenure on discretionary accruals have generally included audit firm tenure in the model (Chi & 
Huang, 2005; Chen et al., 2008; Fargher et al., 2008), this is not case in C&S or Ye et al. 
(2011) studies examining the effects of partner tenure on the opinion of the audit report. 
Nevertheless, none of the abovementioned papers has specifically addressed the differential 
effect of partner tenure on audit quality under long and short audit firm tenures.  
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
In order to control for the potential effects of firm tenure on the actual involvement of the 
engagement partner with the client, table 6 (column A) shows the results of the estimations 
of (2). According to H3 we expected that the negative effect of partner tenure on independence 
would be stronger under long audit firm tenures. However, the interaction variable 
PARTEN*LONGFT shows no significant effects on the likelihood of audit qualifications, and 
therefore similarly to H1 and H2, H3 is also rejected. Results regarding FIRMTEN, PARTEN or 
control variables are qualitative the same as those in table 4 (column A).  
The final analysis regarding the interaction effects of firm and partner tenure consists on 
the exam of auditor independence in audit engagements characterized by long firm and partner 
tenures. Although, according to the evidence reported so far in this paper, we do not expect 
lower independence in these engagements, we consider this a meaningful check, as the prior 
estimations could not adequately account for potential loss of auditor independence in these 
engagements (for example when long partner tenure interact with extremely long audit firm 
tenures). Accordingly, we reestimate (2) after substituting PARTEN*LONGFT by the new 
variable LONGFTLONGPT (long firm and partner tenures defined as 1 for those engagements 
in which firm tenure is ten years or more and partner tenure is more than four years and 0 
otherwise). Results in table 6 (column B) show non-significant results for the new variable. We 
chose the median value of FIRMTEN as the cutoff point to define long audit firm tenures. 
However, similar results are observed (not reported) when long firm tenures are defined as 
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more than 20 years. Thus, even under long tenures with the audit partner and extremely long 
tenures with the audit firm, we do not report loss of independence.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
While a number of papers have addressed the implications of audit firm tenure on various 
proxies of audit quality, just a few articles have examined the effects of partner tenure and 
only two of them have specifically considered the impact of partner tenure on the opinion of 
the audit report, both studying the high litigation risk Australian market. Besides, these studies 
have been conducted under voluntary partner rotation regulations. This paper extends 
previous research, as we study partner tenure in a low litigation risk country and under 
mandatory partner rotation regulation. Moreover, unlike prior research we also examine the 
interaction effects of firm and partner tenure on auditor independence. The results of this 
research might have some use in the current regulatory debate within the EU regarding auditor 
independence. 
Our main finding would be the lack of significant effects of partner tenure on the likelihood 
of audit qualifications. Thus, auditor independence does not seem to be compromised in long-
term engagements with the audit partner. This result is robust to a series of checks. Moreover, 
we do not find different implications of partner tenure on auditor independence depending on 
the tenure with the audit firm. Evidence reported by C&S and Ye et al. (2011) for Australia 
showed negative effects of partner tenure on the likelihood of audit qualifications. Although 
important differences in the methodology and the regulatory context would make difficult the 
comparability of our results with those by C&S and Ye et al. (2011), it is somewhat surprising 
that long partner tenures seem to compromise independence in the high litigation Australian 
market but not it in the Spanish low litigation setting. However, it should be noted that the 
loss of independence reported by C&S for the Australian market was rather weak and limited 
to non-Big 4 firms. If compared with Australia, the pronounced concentration of the Spanish 
market by Big 4 firms could explain these contradictory results. Moreover, C&S and Ye et al. 
(2011) examined partner tenure under voluntary partner rotation while the institutional 
context of this research is characterized by mandatory partner rotation. Precisely, the 
mandatory rotation of partners was imposed in many countries to preserve auditor 
independence. However, further research examining the issue in countries with different legal 
traditions would undoubtedly contribute to a better understanding of the potential loss of 
independence associated to partner tenure.  
Focusing on audit firm tenure, our results do not support loss of independence in long 
tenures with the audit firm for the whole research period. However, we report a negative effect 
of firm tenure on independence in the pre-crisis period, but not during the economic downturn. 
This result might indicate that auditors could be willing to impair independence in long tenures 
with the audit firm, except during periods of economic downturns when the risk of litigation 
increases.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (735 firm-year observations) 
 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN ST. DEV. MAXIMUM MINIMUM 
OPINION 0.15 0.00 0.35 1.00 0.00 
PBANK -2.96 -1.61 32.77 77.56 -938.07 
SIZE  6.68 6.46 2.00 11.77 1.14 
AGE (in years) 16.22 17 5.00 25.00 1.00 
LEV 3.44 1.70 4.76 922.77 -14.46 
CLEV 0.07 -0.03 0.96 13.64 -2.99 
LLOSS 0.14 0.00 0.35 1.00 0.00 
INVEST 0.17 0.08 0.24 2.99 0.00 
AUDFIRM 0.92 1.00 0.27 1.00 0.00 
FIRMTEN 9.78 9.00 5.94 24.00 1.00 
PARTEN 3.33 3.00 2.01 9.00 1.00 
 
OPINION: 1 if company receives an ‘unclean’ audit report and 0 otherwise; PBANK: probability of 
bankruptcy; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company. AGE: natural logarithm of the number 
of years since listing on the supervisor of the Spanish stock market. To facilitate interpretation, this table 
shows descriptive statistics of the variable defined in years; LEV: total liabilities divided by total equity; 
CLEV: change in LEV during the year; LLOSS: 1 if client reported negative net income the previous year 
and 0 otherwise; INVEST: current assets less debtors and inventories, divided by current liabilities; 
AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise; FIRMTEN: number of 
consecutive years audited by the same audit firm; PARTEN: number of consecutive years the partner has 
been signing the audit report of the company.  
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Table 2. Pearson correlations and levels of significance between pairs of variables 
 
 OPINION PBANK SIZE AGE LEV CLEV LLOSS INVEST AUDFIRM FIRMTEN 
PBANK 0.02          
SIZE -0.18*** 0.23***         
AGE -0.03 0.22*** 0.10***        
LEV 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.01 -0.02       
CLEV 0.13*** 0.21*** -0.03 -0.03 0.56***      
LLOSS 0.22*** 0.15*** -0.23*** 0.03 -0.03 0.01     
INVEST -0.12*** -0.21*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.08* 0.04    
AUDFIRM -0.04 -0.01 0.24*** -0.04 -0.00 -0.10*** -0.16*** -0.10***   
FIRMTEN -0.19*** 0.04 0.23*** 0.16*** -0.01 -0.04 -0.16*** 0.03 0.26***  
PARTEN -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.06 -0.07** 0.16*** 
 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
OPINION: 1 if company receives an ‘unclean’ audit report and 0 otherwise; PBANK: probability of 
bankruptcy; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company; AGE: natural logarithm of the number 
of years since listing on the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; LEV: total liabilities divided by total 
equity; CLEV: change in LEV during the year; LLOSS: 1 if client reported negative net income the previous 
year and 0 otherwise; INVEST: current assets less debtors and inventories, divided by current liabilities; 
AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise; FIRMTEN: number of 
consecutive years audited by the same audit firm; PARTEN: number of consecutive years the partner has 
been signing the audit report of the company.  
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Table 3. Median values of independent variables according with auditor opinion. For 
qualitative variables, mean values are provided. 
  
UNQUALIFIED QUALIFIED Sig. Level 
PBANK -1.70 -1.20 *** 
SIZE 6.62 5.45 *** 
AGE (in years) 17 16  
LEV 1.63 1.89  
CLEV -0.03 -0.02  
LLOSS 0.11 0.33 *** 
INVEST 0.09 0.03 *** 
AUDFIRM 0.92 0.89  
FIRMTEN 10.00 6.00 *** 
PARTEN 3.00 3.00  
Number of obs. 600 135  
 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
Significance tests:  
 
Mann-Whitney test of differences of medians for variables: PBANK, SIZE, AGE, LEV, CLEV, INVEST, FIRMTEN and 
PARTEN.  
  
Pearson’s chi-square test for the dichotomous variables: LLOSS and AUDFIRM. 
 
 
OPINION: 1 if company receives an ‘unclean’ audit report and 0 otherwise; PBANK: probability of 
bankruptcy; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company. AGE: natural logarithm of the number 
of years since listing on the supervisor of the Spanish stock market. To facilitate interpretation, this table 
shows descriptive statistics of the variable defined in years; LEV: total liabilities divided by total equity; 
CLEV: change in LEV during the year; LLOSS: 1 if client reported negative net income the previous year 
and 0 otherwise; INVEST: current assets less debtors and inventories, divided by current liabilities; 
AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise; FIRMTEN: number of 
consecutive years audited by the same audit firm; PARTEN: number of consecutive years the partner has 
been signing the audit report of the company.  
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Table 4. The effects of auditor tenure on independence. Results from logistic 
regressions. Parameters estimates and z-values in parentheses 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Column A: 
Estimation of 
(1)  
Column B: 
Estimation of (1) 
with 
SHORTPARTEN and 
LONGPARTEN 
instead of PARTEN 
Column C: 
Estimation of (1) 
with PARTEN and 
PARTEN2 
 
Column D: 
Estimation of (1) 
without 
observations with 
GCMOs 
PBANK + 
0.49 
(2.66) 
*** 0.49 
(2.64) 
*** 0.49 
(2.66) 
*** 0.47 
(2.28) 
** 
SIZE +/- 
-2.05 
(-3.96) 
*** -2.05 
(-3.95) 
*** -2.08 
(-3.96) 
*** -2.94 
(-4.21) 
*** 
AGE - 
-1.71 
(-0.90) 
 -1.65 
(-0.86) 
 -1.87 
(-0.96) 
 -2.09 
(-0.99) 
 
LEV + 
0.07 
(1.22) 
 0.06 
(1.15) 
 0.06 
(1.19) 
 0.15 
(2.10) 
** 
CLEV + 
0.05 
(0.23) 
 0.07 
(0.32) 
 0.05 
(0.26) 
 -0.08 
(-0.31) 
 
LLOSS + 
1.26 
(2.30) 
** 1.21 
(2.21) 
** 1.26 
(2.29) 
** 0.82 
(1.35) 
 
INVEST - 
-5.81 
(-3.18) 
*** -5.72 
(-3.09) 
*** -5.80 
(-3.14) 
*** -5.12 
(-2.54) 
** 
AUDFIRM + 
2.06 
(1.99) 
** 2.04 
(1.97) 
** 2.11 
(2.01) 
** 2.50 
(2.06) 
** 
FIRMTEN -(H2) 
-0.03 
(-0.32) 
 -0.03 
(-0.66) 
 -0.03 
(-0.71) 
 -0.01 
(-0.25) 
 
PARTEN 
- in A (H1); 
+ in C 
0.07 
(0.72) 
   -0.22 
(-0.63) 
 0.11 
(0.95) 
 
SHORTPARTEN +(H1) 
  0.22 
(0.47) 
     
LONGPARTEN -(H1) 
  0.60 
(1.07) 
     
PARTEN2 - 
    0.04 
(0.86) 
   
Constant 
 6.61 
(2.02) 
** 6.47 
(1.93) 
* 7.19 
(2.12) 
** 9.56 
(2.45) 
** 
YEAR 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 
INDUSTRY 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 YES (not 
reported) 
 
N 
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chi (2) 
% Cor. Clas. 
 735 
0.28 
45.93 
90 
 
 
*** 
735 
0.28 
45.96 
90 
 
 
*** 
735 
0.28 
45.85 
90 
 
 
*** 
722 
0.28 
38.99 
91 
 
 
*** 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
PBANK: probability of bankruptcy; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company; AGE: natural 
logarithm of the number of years since listing on the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; LEV: total 
liabilities divided by total equity; CLEV: change in LEV during the year; LLOSS: 1 if client reported negative 
net income the previous year and 0 otherwise; INVEST: current assets less debtors and inventories, 
divided by current liabilities; AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise; 
FIRMTEN: number of consecutive years audited by the same audit firm; PARTEN: number of consecutive 
years the partner has been signing the audit report of the company; SHORTPARTEN: 1 if partner tenure 
is three years or less and 0 otherwise; LONGPARTEN: 1 if partner tenure is more than four years and 0 
otherwise; PARTEN2: the square of PARTEN. 
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Table 5. The effects of auditor tenure on independence before and during economic 
downturns. Results from logistic regressions. Parameters estimates and z-values in 
parentheses 
 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Pre-crisis: 
2002-2007 
Crisis: 
2008-2010 
PBANK + 
0.38 
(1.40) 
 0.06 
(1.72) 
* 
SIZE +/- 
-1.61 
(-3.17) 
*** -1.93 
(-4.47) 
*** 
AGE - 
-0.00 
(-0.00) 
 4.30 
(1.50) 
 
LEV + 
-0.04 
(-0.42) 
 0.18 
(2.24) 
** 
CLEV + 
0.08 
(0.18) 
 -0.14 
(0.93) 
 
LLOSS + 
0.17 
(0.60) 
 0.51 
(0.79) 
 
INVEST - 
-4.28 
(-2.68) 
*** -9.05 
(-1.55) 
 
AUDFIRM + 
1.68 
(2.36) 
** 0.96 
(0.92) 
 
FIRMTEN -(H2) 
-0.09 
(-2.01) 
** -0.05 
(-0.63) 
 
PARTEN -(H1) 
0.02 
(0.29) 
 0.14 
(0.64) 
 
Constant 
 5.02 
(1.64) 
 -0.96 
(-0.25) 
 
YEAR  YES (not reported)  YES (not reported)  
INDUSTRY  YES (not reported)  YES (not reported)  
N 
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chi (2) 
% Cor. Clas. 
 494 
0.26 
86.85 
90 
 
 
*** 
241 
0.44 
56.62 
92 
 
 
*** 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
PBANK: probability of bankruptcy; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company; AGE: natural 
logarithm of the number of years since listing on the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; LEV: total 
liabilities divided by total equity; CLEV: change in LEV during the year; LLOSS: 1 if client reported negative 
net income the previous year and 0 otherwise; INVEST: current assets less debtors and inventories, 
divided by current liabilities; AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise; 
FIRMTEN: number of consecutive years audited by the same audit firm; PARTEN: number of consecutive 
years the partner has been signing the audit report of the company.  
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Table 6. The interaction of firm and partner tenures. Results from logistic 
regressions. Parameters estimates and z-values in parentheses 
 
 
Predicted 
sign 
Column A. 
Estimation of (2) 
 Column B. 
Estimation of (2) 
with 
LONGFTLONGPT 
instead of 
PARTEN*LONGFI
RMTEN  
 
 
PBANK + 
0.49 
(2.68) 
*** 0.49 
(2.66) 
*** 
SIZE - 
-2.03 
(-3.93) 
*** -2.05 
(-3.96) 
*** 
AGE - 
-1.63 
(-0.85) 
 -1.72 
(-0.90) 
 
LEV + 
0.06 
(1.24) 
 0.07 
(1.21) 
 
CLEV + 
0.05 
(0.25) 
 0.05 
(0.24) 
 
LLOSS + 
1.26 
(2.29) 
** 1.25 
(2.29) 
** 
INVEST - 
-5.82 
(-3.18) 
*** -5.81 
(-3.18) 
** 
AUDFIRM + 
2.09 
(2.01) 
** 2.05 
(1.99) 
** 
FIRMTEN -(H2) 
-0.02 
(-0.29) 
 -0.03 
(-0.73) 
 
PARTEN -(H1) 
0.11 
(0.99) 
 0.06 
(0.57) 
 
PARTEN*LONGFT -(H3) 
-0.10 
(-0.72) 
   
LONGFTLONGPT - 
  0.09 
(0.13) 
 
Constant 
 6.37 
(1.94) 
* 6.63 
(2.02) 
** 
YEAR  YES (not reported)  YES (not reported)  
INDUSTRY  YES (not reported)  YES (not reported)  
N 
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chi (2) 
% Cor. Clas. 
 735 
0.28 
46.14 
90 
 
 
*** 
735 
0.28 
45.95 
90 
 
 
*** 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
PBANK: probability of bankruptcy; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets of the company; AGE: natural 
logarithm of the number of years since listing on the supervisor of the Spanish stock market; LEV: total 
liabilities divided by total equity; CLEV: change in LEV during the year; LLOSS: 1 if client reported negative 
net income the previous year and 0 otherwise; INVEST: current assets less debtors and inventories, 
divided by current liabilities; AUDFIRM: 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise; 
FIRMTEN: number of consecutive years audited by the same audit firm; PARTEN: number of consecutive 
years the partner has been signing the audit report of the company; LONGFT: 1 if audit firm tenure is ten 
years of more, and 0 otherwise; LONGFTLONGPT: 1 if firm tenure ten years or more and partner tenure 
is more than four years and 0 otherwise. 
